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1 - Introduction: From the Traditional Interpretation towards New 
Openings 
 
Recent contributions to studies in Law and Religion in the European Union1 
show that Article 17 TFEU has gradually gained a central position in the EU 
legal system. Nevertheless, its interpretations still remain unclear.  
Declaration 11 attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam (the direct 
ancestor of Article 17 TFEU’s first two paragraphs)2 meant to satisfy the 
                                                          
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 The Italian expression “diritto ecclesiastico europeo” (which means, in the impossibility 
of giving a literal traslation, “European Law and Religion System”) has already appeared 
in several contributions, including: M. LUGLI, J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, I. PISTOLESI, 
Elementi di diritto ecclesiastico europeo, Giappichelli, Torino, 2012; G. MACRÌ, M. PARISI, 
V. TOZZI, Diritto ecclesiastico europeo, Laterza, Bari, 2006; G. DALLA TORRE, Verso un 
diritto ecclesiastico europeo? Annotazioni preliminari sulla Costituzione, in Quaderni di diritto e 
politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 2005, p. 399 ff.; J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Parità di trattamento e 
organizzazioni di tendenza religiose nel "nuovo” diritto ecclesiastico europeo, in Quaderni di diritto 
e politica ecclesiastica, n. 1, 2013, p. 71 ff. 
2 On Declaration n. 11 see M. VENTURA, La laicità dell’Unione europea. Diritti, mercato, 
religione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2001, p. 239 ff.; G. ROBBERS, Europa e religione: la 
dichiarazione sullo status delle Chiese e delle organizzazioni non confessionali nell'atto finale del 
Trattato di Amsterdam, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 1998, p. 393 ff.; M. 
PARISI, Dalla dichiarazione n. 11 alla futura Carta Costituzionale dell'Unione europea: quale 
ruolo per le confessioni religiose nel processo di integrazione europea?, in Il Diritto Ecclesiastico, n. 
1, 2003, p. 334 ff.; S. BERLINGÒ, La condizione delle Chiese in Europa, in Il Diritto ecclesiastico, 
n. 1, 2002, p. 1314 ff.; A. LICASTRO, Unione europea e “status” delle confessioni religiose: fra 
tutela dei diritti umani fondamentali e salvaguardia delle identità costituzionali, Giuffrè, Milano, 
2014, p. 132 ff.; A. PIERUCCI, Après Amsterdam: quelles relations entre Institutions 
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interest of the Member States in maintaining their sovereignty in religious 
matters and, at the same time, the interest of the dominant religious 
denominations in preserving the favorable status they enjoyed at a national 
level3. Its formulation was the result of a consistent lobbying activity4 
carried out by some churches (in particular the Catholic Church and the 
German Protestant Churches) worried that, in the wake of the reforms 
brought by the Maastricht Treaty5, European Union's incompetence in 
relationships between the State and the churches could be subverted6. 
However, the text of the Declaration allowed the interpreters to undertake 
new paths, diverging from the intentions of its promoters. As a matter of 
                                                          
Européennes et Eglises, in A.G. CHIZZONITI (ed), Chiese, associazioni, comunità religiose e 
organizzazioni non confessionali nell’Unione europea, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2002, p. 13 ff.  
3 Cf. S. FERRARI, Integrazione Europea e prospettive di evoluzione della disciplina giuridica 
del fenomeno religioso, in V. TOZZI (ed.), Integrazione europea e società multi-etnica. Nuove 
dimensioni della libertà religiosa, Giappichelli, Torino, 2000, p. 138 ff.; G. ROBBERS, An article 
on religious communities in European primary law, in Commission des Episcopats de la 
Communaté européenne, La construction européen et les institutions religieuses, Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 1997, pp. 66 and 70; I.C. IBAN, Europa, diritto, religione, il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, 
p. 171; G. CASUSCELLI, Le laicità e le democrazie: la laicità della “Repubblica democratica” 
secondo la Costituzione italiana, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 1, 2007, p. 196 ff.; 
A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 123; A. NICORA, Il ruolo della COMECE nel quadro 
dei rapporti tra Chiesa cattolica e Unione europea, in A.G. CHIZZONITI (ed.), Chiese, associazioni, 
comunità religiose e organizzazioni non confessionali nell’Unione Europea, Vita e Pensiero, 
Milano, 2002, p. 48.  
4 On religious lobbying in the EU see G. MACRÌ, Il ruolo delle organizzazioni religiose in 
Italia e in Europa tra rappresentanza degli interessi e attività di lobbying, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, Online journal (www.statoechiese.it), n. 8, 2013; G.B. VARNIER, 
Laicità, radici cristiane e regolamentazione del fenomeno religioso nella dimensione dell’U.E., in 
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., June, 2008, p. 7 ff. 
5 Article F.1 of Maastricht Treaty recognised fundamental rights as general principles 
of EU law. Cf. F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, Il fenomeno religioso nel sistema giuridico 
dell'Unione europea, in F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, C. MIRABELLI, F. ONIDA, Religioni 
e sistemi giuridici. Introduzione al diritto ecclesiastico comparato, il Mulino, Bologna, 1997, p. 
144 ff. 
6 The elaboration of the text of the Declaration was decisively influenced by the 
proposals which the main denominational groups put forward through the States. See, in 
particular, the proposals presented by Italy, Austria and Germany, which were endorsed 
by the Holy See, and by German churches and evangelical communities. Cf. F. 
MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, Il fenomeno religioso nel sistema giuridico dell'Unione Europea, in 
F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, C. MIRABELLI, F. ONIDA, Religioni e sistemi giuridici,. cit., 
p. 159; A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 127 ff.; D. DURISOTTO, Unione europea, chiese 
e organizzazioni filosofiche non confessionali (art. 17 TFUE), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., n. 23, 2016, p. 23.  
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fact, it lacked binding value and it put on the same level religious 
denominations and philosophical and non-denominational organizations7.  
Since Declaration 11 proved to be an “inadequate barrier”8, CEC and 
COMECE9 presented, on the occasion of the drafting of the European 
Constitution, a proposal aimed at curbing the impact of Union Law on their 
activities10. This document, in its first part, asked for a provision which 
could expressly secure the right of self determination of churches and 
religious communities in their teachings and organisation and, in 
particular, protect religiously motivated activities especially in the field of 
worship, charity, culture and pastoral care. The proposal joined a 
complicated political framework; there was at time an intense discussion 
about the opportunity to include a direct reference to the Christian-Jewish 
roots of Europe in the Constitution11.  
A few years later, Article 17 TFEU recognized an exclusive national 
competence on the status of religious denominations. The provision seemed 
to be in accordance with principle of conferral, which find its legal basis in 
Articles 4, first paragraph, and 5, second paragraph, TEU, and the related, 
                                                          
7 Cf. F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, In Europa il Vaticano è declassato, in Limes, 2000, p. 157 
ff.; A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 157; M. VENTURA, La laicità dell’Unione Europea, 
cit., p. 239 ff.  
8 So is defined by I.C. IBÁN, Europa, diritto, religione, cit., p. 157.  
9 On CEC (Conference of European Churches) see G. LONG, La Conferenza delle chiese 
europee (Kek) e l’attuazione del Trattato di Lisbona, in L. DE GREGORIO (ed.), Le Confessioni 
religiose nel diritto dell’Unione europea, il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, p. 69 ff.; G. FELICIANI, Il 
Consiglio delle Conferenze d’Europa dopo gli avvenimenti del 1989, in A.G. CHIZZONITI (ed.), 
Chiese, associazioni, cit., p. 57 ff.; on COMECE (Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of 
the European Union) D. DA CUNHA, Il Consiglio delle Conferenze dei vescovi d’Europa, in L. 
DE GREGORIO (ed.), Le Confessioni religiose, cit., p. 63 ff.; A. NICORA, Il ruolo della COMECE 
nel quadro dei rapporti tra Chiesa cattolica e Unione europea, in A.G. CHIZZONITI (ed.), Chiese, 
associazioni, cit., p. 47 ff.  
10 Church and Society Commission of the Conference of European Churches, 
Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community, Churches and 
Religious Communities in a Constitutional Treaty of the european Union, Bruxelles, 27 settembre 
2002, in (www.comece.org). For an exam of the proposal see M. VENTURA, L’articolo 17 
TFUE come fondamento del diritto e della politica ecclesiastica dell’Unione europea, in Quaderni di 
diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 2014, p. 295.  
11 On this issue see, among the others: P. GROSSI, A proposito del preambolo della 
Costituzione dell’Unione europea, in A. D’ATENA, P. GROSSI (eds.), Tutela dei diritti 
fondamentali, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004, p. 45 ff.; G. LEZIROLI, La cristianità obliata della 
Costituzione europea, in Il Diritto Ecclesiastico, n. 3, 2003, p. 1087 ff.; M. PARISI, Il sistema 
europeo di relazioni tra gli Stati e le organizzazioni religiose: conservazione o innovazione nella 
prospettiva della Costituzione dell’Unione europea?, in Il Diritto Ecclesiastico, n. 1, 2005, p. 347. 
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though unexpressed, principle of neutrality. The EU neutrality “by 
abstention”, which implies “the separation between the churches and the 
EU institutions” 12, is not an explicit choice for secularism, but the result of 
the absence of a transfer of soveregnity with regard to religious and cultural 
identification.  
Some scholars soon defined Article 17 TFEU a "safeguard clause" (in 
favor of national sovereignty and not directly of denominational 
autonomy)13; as to be expected, this traditional interpretation was later, 
explicitly and implicitly, endorsed by some Member States. Italy, for 
example, in its written observations submitted in the preliminary ruling 
Jehovan todistajat14 (which leak out through the opinion of the Advocate 
General), declared that rules which concern religious organizations come 
out of the scope of EU Law and, therefore, should exclusively remain 
national competence15. Similarly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the (so-
called) Lissabon-Urteil case16, after recalling EU’s commitment (according to 
Article 4, second paragraph, TEU) to respect the identities of Member States, 
has brought back the determination of the status of religious denominations 
to the intangible core of German constitutional system (para. 249). As a 
matter of fact, the right to democratic self-determination of the German 
people would include, among the others, the power to decide on the status 
of churches and religious or ideological communities (para. 260). Some time 
later, France, in its observations to the Court of Justice in the Achbita case, 
                                                          
12 Decision of the European Ombudsman in his inquiry into complaint 2097/2011/RA 
against the European Commission, para 38.  
13 The Italian expression for “safeguard clause” (clausola di salvaguardia) has been used 
refering to the Declaration 11, inter alia, by S. BERLINGÒ, La condizione delle Chiese in 
Europa, in Diritto ecclesiastico, n. 1 del 2002, p. 1314, and M. VENTURA, La laicità dell’Unione 
europea. Diritti, mercato, religione, cit., p. 239; with regard to Article 17 TFEU it has been used 
by C. HONORATI, Art. 17 TFUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (eds.), Commentario breve ai 
trattati dell’Unione europea, Padova, Cedam, 2014, p. 198 ff.; A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, 
cit., p. 144.  
14 Court of Justice, 10 July 2018, Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17. 
15 “The argument of the defendant in the main proceedings is, in essence, that 
proselytising, in connection with which the data of the persons visited by members of 
religious community are collected and processed, is an activity that falls outside the scope 
of EU law s provided for in that provision. The Italian government, for its part, in reaching 
the same conclusion as the defendant in the main proceedings, invokes Art. 17 TFEU, 
which provides that the Member States have exclusive competence to regulate religious 
organisations”: Opinion of the Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi delivered on 1 February 
2018, Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17, para. 28.  
16 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 30 June 2009, n. 2 of 2008.  
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stated that European anti-discrimination law would not apply to the French 
public sector if the discriminatory treatment were justified by the principle 
of laïcité, which imposes a strict separation between the public sphere and 
the religious one17. The so-called negative secularism, which characterizes 
the French State, would be safeguarded not only by Article 4, second 
paragraph, TEU, but also by Article 17, first and second paragraphs, TFEU; 
the latter is, according to part of the legal scholars, a species of the former in 
the religious sphere18.  
Although the traditional interpretation of Article 17 TFEU as an 
abstract “safeguard clause” seems to find confirmation in the letter of the 
provision and in the systematic reading with the Article 4, second 
paragraph, TEU, as well as in the original will of the parties, part of the 
doctrine has given credit to a different interpretation: the Article could 
allow the development of a European Law and Religion System19. If this 
interpretation prevailed, the provision would be subject to a certain 
“heterogony of ends”: the supposed clause of safeguard for national law 
would prove to be the foundation of the European Law and Religion 
system. This evolution could be favored by the essential vagueness of the 
provision, by the current opinion of the Court of Justice and by the growing 
importance acquired, in an axiological-systematic sense, by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
This article aims to analyze the aforementioned factors in order to 
verify if the situation could evolve in a (more or less) distant future. 
                                                          
17 For example, the prohibition of wearing religious symbols in the workplace could be 
discriminatory under EU Law. The French intervention is reported by the Opinion of 
Advocate General Juliane Kokott delivered on 31 May 2016, Achbita, C-157/15, para. 31. 
Cf. L. SALVADEGO, Il divieto per i dipendenti di imprese private di esibire simboli religiosi 
all’esame della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, n. 3, 
2017, p. 824 ff. 
18 See M. LUGATO, L’Unione europea e le Chiese: l’art. 17 TFUE nella prospettiva del 
principio di attribuzione, del rispetto delle identità nazionali e della libertà religiosa, in Quaderni di 
diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 2014, p. 312; M. PARISI, Vita democratica e processi politici 
nella sfera pubblica europea. Sul nuovo ruolo istituzionale delle organizzazioni confessionali dopo il 
Trattato di Lisbona, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 27, 2013, p. 14 ff.; A. 
LICASTRO, A. RUGGERI, Diritto concordatario versus diritto eurounitario: a chi spetta la 
primauté? (a margine della pronunzia della Corte di Giustizia del 27 giugno 2017, C-74/16, in tema 
di agevolazioni fiscali per le “attività economiche” della Chiesa), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., n. 26, 2017, p. 25 ff. 
19 Cf. M. VENTURA, L’articolo 17 TFUE, cit., p. 304; F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, M. 
ORLANDI, Art. 17 TFUE, in A. TIZZANO (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea, Giuffrè, Milano, 
2014, p. 454. 
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However, this work means primarily to be a reflection on the current 
situation, and only secondly predictive. As a matter of fact, this paper’s 
purpose is not to draw a map of the imaginable interpretative paths but 
mainly to ascertain their legal ground to be in the light of the current 
circumstances.  
Another methodological point: the (nearly) absence of reference to 
scientific works of foreign scholars, besides their numerical scarcity on this 
topic, is due to the precise will to bring out the specific point of view of the 
Italian legal literature which has, for clear historical reasons, a peculiar 
approach towards legal religious matters.  
The two following sections deal with one of the evolutive factors 
above: Section 2 focuses on the provision’s relevant interpretative 
difficulties, while Section 3 analizes some EU interests which the Court of 
Justice balanced, in the past, and should balance, in the future, with Article 




2 - Some Interpretative Difficulties  
 
As some scholars pointed out, to define the objective scope of Article 17 
TFEU is extremely complex20. First of all, the meaning of the expression 
status is not clear; the latter could represent, alternatively, the whole 
national Law and Religion system, just its institutional dimension21, merely 
the legislation which results from a negotiation with denominations22, or 
the set of principles which characterize the State in its essence23.  
To summarize Italian legal literature’s opinion on this topic, two 
different positions could be identified: the first leads back the word status 
to the qualification of the denominational organizations before the State 
(namely every regulation about the corporate dimension of religious 
                                                          
20 Cf. M. VENTURA, L’articolo 17 TFUE, cit., p. 299.  
21 Cf. I.C. IBÁN, Europa, diritto, religione, cit., p. 266.  
22 See S. MONTESANO, Brevi riflessioni sull’art. 17 TFUE e sul progetto di Direttiva del 
Consiglio recante disposizioni in materia di divieto di discriminazione, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., n. 18, 2015, p. 16.  
23 G. CASUSCELLI, Le fonti, in G. CASUSCELLI (ed.), Nozioni di diritto ecclesiastico, 5th ed., 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, p. 30.  
 23 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 1 del 2020  ISSN 1971- 8543 
freedom24), while the second to the State’s self-qualification in the religious 
field (namely the fundamental principles in matter of relationship between 
State and religion)25. According to both interpretations, Article 17 TFEU 
would not exclude a European competence in matters of religious 
freedom26. As a matter of fact, contrary to its corporate dimension, which, 
in accordance to the traditional interpretation of Article 17 TFUE, should be 
exclusively regulated by national disciplines, the individual dimension of 
religious freedom is also regulated at supranational level. However, the 
distinction between the two aspects, although is theoretically admissible, 
may actually prove fragile: the existence of an institutional dimension, in 
fact, is often a necessary condition for the effective enjoyment of the rights 
at an individual level27. 
A former Italian President of the European Commission, way before 
the Lisbon Treaty, declared that the status has to be regulated in the national 
democratic and political context and that also the sphere of individual 
rights of the citizens falls in this framework. Besides, he admitted that there 
may be important differences between Member States28.  
The legal status of churches and religious associations is regulated by 
Member Countries with juridical instruments of different nature: 
constitutional norms, instruments of international laws, ordinary laws. 
Furthermore, to identify the status to safeguard is more difficult in those 
national Law and Religion systems which reject forms of normative 
specialization in this legal sector and which refer the entire legal discipline 
                                                          
24 Critical on this “all-embracing” interpretation R. PUZA, Effetti dell’ordinamento 
comunitario sullo status delle confessioni religiose nei paesi dell’Unione europea, in L. DE 
GREGORIO (ed.), Le Confessioni religiose, cit., p. 51. 
25 Cf. M. TOSCANO, La decisione del Mediatore europeo del 25 gennaio 2013: un passo avanti 
verso un’applicazione efficace dell’art. 17 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea?, in 
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 5, 2014, p. 18.  
26 Cf. C. HONORATI, Art. 17 TFUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (eds.), Commentario breve, 
cit., p. 199. 
27 Cf. A. MORINI, Art. 17 TFUE, in C. CURTI GIALDINO (ed.), Codice dell’Unione europea 
operativo. TUE e TFUE commentati articolo per articolo con la Carta dei diritti fondamentali 
dell’Unione europea, Simone, Napoli, 2012, p. 542 ff.; S. FERRARI, Integrazione Europea e 
prospettive di evoluzione della disciplina giuridica del fenomeno religioso, cit., p. 140; IBAN I. C., 
Europa, diritto, religione, cit., p. 166 ff.; A. PIERUCCI, La posizione degli Stati dell’Unione 
europea nel dibattito sulle “chiese” nella revisione del Trattato di Maastricht, in A. CASTRO JOVER 
(ed.), Iglesias, confesiones y comunidades religiosas en la Unión Europea, Universidad del País 
Vasco, Bilbao, 1999, p. 89; A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 11 ff.  
28 R. PRODI, Unione Europea, libertà religiosa e confessioni religiose. Problemi e prospettive, 
in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 2003, p. 316.  
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of the religious phenomenon to ordinary law29. The typological variety of 
forms of legislation is, without any doubts, the uppermost obstacle in 
defining the term status; it would be a mistake trying to define it from a 
single national prospective.  
The third paragraph of the Article, which commits the Union to 
maintain an "open, transparent and regular dialogue" with the churches and 
the organizations mentioned in the first two paragraphs, could be a useful 
instrument to go beyond an ineffective unidirectional approach. Some 
authors believe that this paragraph could be considered a direct expression 
of the principle of democratic participation ex Article 11, second paragraph, 
TEU30. As a matter of fact, both provisions would be part of a shared 
sovereignty project inspired to the principle of subsidiarity31 (already stated 
by the Treaty of Maastricht and then reiterated in the White Paper on 
European Governance32).  
The (so-called) “horizontal subsidiarity” is a legal instrument 
through which private subjects can provide not only general services, but 
also public services33. Religious bodies often carry out services which are of 
collective interest; the sector of personal services, in particular, is a field 
where the activities of religious denominations frequently interweave with 
                                                          
29 A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 210.  
30 On Article I-52 of the European Constitution see N. COLAIANNI, Stato e confessioni 
religiose in Europa tra separazione e cooperazione, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 
2, 2009, p. 289; on Article 17 TFEU see S. MONTESANO, Brevi riflessioni sull’art. 17 TFUE, 
cit., p. 9 ff.; F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, M. ORLANDI, Art. 17 TFUE, in A. TIZZANO (ed.), 
Trattati dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 461; C. HONORATI, Art. 17 TFUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. 
BARUFFI (eds.), Commentario breve, cit., p. 201; F. ALICINO, Costituzionalismo e diritto europeo 
delle religioni, Cedam, Padova, 2011, p. 139. The European Ombudsman in the Decision n. 
2097 of 25 January 2013 has connected Article 17, third paragraph, TFEU to the principle 
of participatory democracy. 
31 Cf. M. VENTURA, Sussidiarietà, governance e gruppi religiosi nel sistema giuridico 
dell’Unione europea, in G. CIMBALO, J.I. ALONSO Pérez (eds.), Federalismo, regionalismo e 
principio di sussidiarietà orizzontale. Le azioni, le strutture, le regole della collaborazione con enti 
confessionali, Giappichelli, Torino, 2005, p. 206 ff.; R. MAZZOLA, Confessioni, organizzazioni 
filosofiche e associazioni religiose nell’Unione Europea tra speranze disilluse e problemi emergenti, 
in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 3, 2014, p. 3.  
32 European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, COM (2001) 428. Among 
the others, the White Paper stated that “[c]hurches and religious communities have a particular 
contribution to make” (p. 15).  
33 F. BOTTI, Le confessioni religiose e il principio di sussidiarietà nell’Unione europea: un 
nuovo giurisdizionalismo attraverso il mercato, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 
January, 2011, p. 15. On ‘horizontal subsidiarity’ in general terms see P. DURET, La 
sussidiarietà “orizzontale”: le radici e le suggestioni di un concetto, in Ius, 2001, p. 95 ff.  
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European Union Law34. In this area two opposing interests coexist: the 
European interest of safeguarding the competition in the Single Market and 
the interest of denominations of being bearers of a religious message. 
Sometimes, in order to protect the specific denominational identities, 
it could be necessary to admit exceptions to the rules of the Single Market35. 
The dialogue between European Institutions and denominational and non-
denominational authorities could be instrumental to the implementation of 
the principle of horizontal subsidiarity: its purpose could be to coordinate 
EU’s activities with the ones of denominational subjects. The dialogue with 
the interested parties could be an instrument through which to identify and, 
therefore, to preserve the national disciplines which protect the 
denominational specificity36. Interpreting the Article as a whole, the 
"specificity" mentioned by the third paragraph could constitute, at the same 
time, the object of the dialogue and the object of the safeguard clause37. 
Article 17 TFEU, interpreted in light of principle of proportionality 
and reasonableness, refrain the EU from regulating only those questions 
that are peculiarly religious, namely those which would be unreasonable 
                                                          
34 In the opinion in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania contro Ayuntamiento de 
Getafepunto, C‑74/16, para 45, Avdocate General Kokott underlines that “status entails the 
churches performing not only strictly religious tasks in society but also making significant 
contributions to social, cultural and educational objectives. To classify the activity of the 
churches in the social, cultural or educational areas generally as forming part of normal 
economic life, would be to ignore the special nature of that activity and, thus, ultimately 
also the special status of the churches”.  
35 It is the case of the EC directive n. 78/2000, which at Article 4, second paragraph, 
allows States to retain previous disciplines in favor of trend organizations. Cf., among 
others, F. ONIDA, Il problema delle organizzazioni di tendenza nella Direttiva CE 2000/78 
attuativa dell’art. 13 del Trattato sull’Unione europea, in Il Diritto ecclesiastico, n. 1, 2001, p. 905 
ff.; M. CORTI, Diritto dell’Unione europea e status delle confessioni religiose. Profili lavoristici, 
in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., February 2011; J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Parità 
di trattamento e organizzazioni di tendenza religiose nel “nuovo” diritto ecclesiastico europeo, cit., 
p. 71 ff.; P. CHIECO, Le nuove direttive comunitarie sul divieto di discriminazione, in Rivista 
italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, n. 75, 2002, p. 77 ff.  
36 Cf. A. LICASTRO, Unione europea, cit., p. 208 ff. 
37 Cf. F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, Sussidiarietà e confessioni religiose, in G. CIMBALO, J.I. 
ALONSO PÉREZ (eds.), Federalismo, regionalismo, cit., p. 467. The Commission, in the written 
statement presented to the European Ombudsman (decision n. 2097 of 2011), as well as in 
its guidelines on the Article (20 July 2013), showed to intend the dialogue in a different 
way; as a matter of fact, it should concern general topics included in the political agenda 
of the Union. Critically on this interpretation M. TOSCANO, La decisione del mediatore 
europeo, cit., p. 23 ff.; P. ANNICCHINO, Il Dialogo con i gruppi religiosi e le organizzazioni non 
confessionali nel Diritto dell’Unione europea: a proposito di una recente pronuncia del Mediatore 
europeo, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 3, 2013, p. 756.  
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(considering the specialty of the case, not only by a subjective but, first of 
all, by an objective point of view) to submit to the ordinary discipline. 
Sometimes denominations do not carry out religious activities; in these 
cases, they have to be considered like other market participants38. When a 
certain activity, although it formally involves religious subjects, does not 
pursue any specifical religious aims there would be no reason to derogate 
from EU law. As a matter of fact, from a non-formalistic point of view, only 
those national disciplines which concretely protect the “specific contribution” 




3 - The Necessary Balance with Other European Interests  
 
As other provisions which outline the boundaries between the system they 
belong to and an outsider, Article 17 TFEU raises a problem of competence 
on the competence itself (which means to determine who has to solve a 
possible conflict of competence between two jurisdictions). 
The interpretation of the Article 17 TFEU could not be handed over 
to States. As a matter of fact, in so doing, the effectiveness and the unity of 
the European Law would be affected by the discretion of the States which 
could label the most varied disciplines as “status” and subtract them from 
the application of EU rules. Therefore, the interpretation of the Article could 
only be a task of the European institutions and, in particular, of the Court 
of Justice. 
The Court, moving away from traditional readings, denied that 
Article 17 TFEU represents an all-around exception and that EU Law could 
not deal with religious and denominational issues. In Egenberger judgment, 
the Court stated that Article 17 TFEU does not prevent a judicial review on 
employment relationships in the context of those organisations whose ethos 
is based on religion or belief (in favor of which the Directive n. 78/2000, 
                                                          
38 In Steymann case (Court of Justice, 5 October 1988, Steymann v. Staatssecretaris Van 
Justitie, 196/87, para 9) the Court stated that “in view of the objectives of the European 
Economic Community, participation in a community based on religion or another form of 
philosophy falls within the field of application of Community law only in so far as it can 
be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty”. In line 
with this statement, in the later Association Eglise de Scientology de Paris case (Court of 
Justice, 14 March 2000, Association Eglise de Scientology de Paris, Scientology International 
Reserve Trus v. The Prime Minister, C-54/99) the Court has neglected the religious aspects 
of the question and ensured the free movement of capital (ex Article 56 TEC, now Article 
63 TFEU).  
 27 
Rivista telematica (https://www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 1 del 2020  ISSN 1971- 8543 
which establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation, provide for derogations)39.  
The Advocate General, in his conclusions, after excluding that the 
article could constitute “a kind of wholesale transfer to Member State law 
of judicial review of the justification for unequal treatment on the basis of 
religion of belief”, underlined the duty of the judge to balance the rights of 
the organization with those of the worker, with each other competing40. The 
Advocate General has also underlined that neutrality duty could not 
compromise the obligation for national States to respect the Law of the 
Union, under any circumstances41. 
This interpretation has been confirmed in other pronunciations; first 
of all in IR v. JQ42, which is considered Egenberger’s twin case43, then in 
Cresco Investigation44 and Jehovan Todistajat45, which explicitly refer to 
Egenberger. In these recent rulings, the Court confirmed that the affirmation 
of a national competence in religious matters ex Article 17 TFEU should not 
be determined ex ante, but as a positive outcome of a concrete balance 
among other European interests, ruled by principle of proportionality46.  
This balance is even more necessary since Article 17 TFEU is part of 
a system which protects Fundamental Rights, in particular freedom of 
religion47. Religious freedom is guaranteed by Article 10 of Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union48; the Court of Justice has 
                                                          
39 Court of Justice, 17 April 2018, Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und 
Entwicklung eV, C- 414/16, para. 56-69. 
40 Opinion of Advocate General in Egenberger, para. 98.  
41 Opinion of the Advocate General in Egenberger, para. 93.  
42 Court of Justice, 11 September 2018, IR v. JQ, C-68/17. 
43 M.E. GENNUSA, Libertà religiosa collettiva e principio di non discriminazione nel sistema 
‘costituzionale’ dell’Unione europea, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 2, 2019, p. 
9.  
44 Court of Justice, 22 January 2019, Cresco Investigation GmbH, C-193/17. 
45 Court of Justice, 10 July 2018, Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17. 
46 Similarly, but before the Court’s judgement S. MONTESANO, Brevi riflessioni sull’art. 
17 TFUE, cit., p. 33.  
47 P. FLORIS, Organizzazioni di tendenza religiosa tra Direttiva europea, diritti nazionali e 
Corte di giustizia UE, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 12, 2019, p. 16.  
48 On the Article, see F. DONATI, Art. 10. Libertà di pensiero, di coscienza e di religione, in 
R. MASTROIANNI, O. POLLICINO, S. ALLEGREZZA, F. PAPPALARDO, O. RAZZOLINI (eds.), Carta 
dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, Giuffrè, Milano, 2017; G. PERTILE, Libertà di 
pensiero, di coscienza e di religione, in L. PINESCHI (ed.), La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani. 
Norme, garanzie, prassi, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, p. 409 ff. Since under Art. 52, para. 3, of the 
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already clarified that this right includes both the freedom of the (so-called) 
forum internum, and the freedom of the (so-called) forum externum, namely 
the right to manifest religion or belief, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance49. Apart from the Achbita case and few others, the Court had no 
possibility to express about Article 10 CFREU. One of the reasons for this 
scarcity in the number of pronunciations is, without any doubt, the narrow 
scope of application of the Article. As a matter of fact, as for other articles 
of the Charter, Article 10 is only a legitimacy parameter of the European 
Law and it could hardly be invoked in a horizontal controversy50.  
A different discourse must be made for Article 21 of the Charter (that 
establishes a general principle of non-discrimination, including on the basis 
of religion), whose scope has recently been extended according to the same 
Court. As stated in more than a judgment, the provision, which is 
sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, is capable of directly 
attributing rights to individuals and could, therefore, be invoked in 
horizontal disputes between privates51. It is enough to recall Egenberger and 
                                                          
Charter the provision has the same meaning and scope of Article 9 ECHR, see also J. 
PASQUALI CERIOLI, La tutela della libertà religiosa nella Convenzione europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., January, 2011; M. TOSCANO, Il 
fattore religioso nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo. Itinerari giurisprudenziali, ETS, 
Pisa, 2018, p. 111 ff.; R. MAZZOLA (ed.), Diritto e religione in Europa. Rapporto sulla 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo in materia di libertà religiosa, il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2012; C. MORVIDUCCI, La protezione della libertà religiosa nel sistema del Consiglio 
d’Europa, in S. FERRARI, T. SCOVAZZI (eds.), La tutela della libertà di religione, Cedam, Padova, 
1988, p. 41 ff.; B. CONFORTI, La tutela internazionale della libertà religiosa, in Rivista 
internazionale dei diritti dell’uomo, n. 2, 2002, p. 207 ff.; G. CASUSCELLI, Convenzione europea, 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo e sua incidenza sul diritto ecclesiastico 
italiano. Un’opportunità per la ripresa del pluralismo confessionale?, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., September, 2011; F. ALICINO, Costituzionalismo e diritto europeo delle 
religioni, cit., p. 246 ff.  
49 Court of Justice, 14 March 2017, Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen 
en voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions, C-157/15, para. 28.  
50 See F. FERRARO, N. LAZZERINI, Art. 52, in R. MASTROIANNI, O. POLLICINO, S. 
ALLEGREZZA, F. PAPPALARDO, O. RAZZOLINI (eds.), Carta dei diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 1058 
ff. 
51 Cf. C. FAVILLI, F. GUARRIELLO, Art. 21, in R. MASTROIANNI, O. POLLICINO, S. 
ALLEGREZZA, F. PAPPALARDO, O. RAZZOLINI (eds.), Carta dei diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 417 
ff.; F. CROCI, Interazioni tra principi (e tra fonti) e criteri di bilanciamento nel diritto dell’Unione 
europea: la sentenza Egenberger e i successivi sviluppi, in AA. VV. (Antonio Angelucci et al.), 
Pluralismo rteligioso e integhrazione auropea: le nuove sfide, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., n. 2, 2019, p.86 ff.; L. CAPPUCCIO, L’efficacia diretta orizzontale della Carta 
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Cresco cases, where the Court operated a balance between Article 21 of the 
Charter and Article 17 TFEU and recognized the prevalence, in the concrete 
case, of the former over the latter.  
It is worth mentioning Article 22 of the Charter, which expresses EU 
commitment to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. The 
Article should have made a direct reference to minority rights, but in the 
end, after the opposition of the French Government, it has been chosen the 
current formulation which calls into question the overall meaning of the 
article52. Given this vagueness, the Article allows two opposing 
interpretations: on the one hand, a rule aimed at promoting national 
identities, on the other, a rule in favor of the rights of the minorities53.  
Another European interest which could be involved in the 
abovementioned balance is the right to privacy, which is protected by the 
system of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter. As a matter of fact, 
denominational organisations often process personal and sensitive data of 
their faithful (and also others). The General Data Protection Regulation 
(Regulation n. 2016/679), at Recital (165), makes an express reference to 
Article 17 TFUE, while, at Article 91, first paragraph, allows churches and 
religion associations to apply comprehensive rules relating to the protection 
of natural persons with regard to processing, provided that they are 
brought into line with this Regulation54. In this case, the EU legislator felt it 
                                                          
dei diritti fondamentali nella decisione Vera Egenberger, in Quaderni costituzionali, n. 3, 2018, p. 
708 ff.  
52 See A. ALÌ, Art. 22, in R. MASTROIANNI, O. POLLICINO, S. ALLEGREZZA, F. PAPPALARDO, 
O. RAZZOLINI (eds.), Carta dei diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 438; C. PICIOCCHI, La Carta tra 
identità culturali nazionali ed individuali, in R. TONIATTI (ed.), Diritto, diritti e giurisdizione, la 
Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea, Cedam, Padova, 2002, p. 125 ff.  
53 For the first meaning see M. PARISI, Vita democratica, cit., p. 11; P. FLORIS, L’Unione 
e il rispetto delle diversità. Intorno all’art. 22 della Carta di Nizza, in C. CARDIA (ed.), Studi in 
onore di Anna Ravà, Giappichelli, Torino, 2003, p. 421 ff. Differently A. LICASTRO, 
L’influenza della Carta di Nizza sui sistemi nazionali europei di disciplina del fenomeno religioso: 
verso un diritto ecclesiastico dell’Unione?, in L. D’ANDREA, G. MOSCHELLA, A. RUGGERI, A. 
SAITTA (eds.), La Carta dei diritti dell’Unione Europea e le altre Carte (ascendenze culturali e 
mutue implicazioni), Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, p. 332 ff.  
54 Article 91, second paragraph, subjects these comprehensive rules to the supervision 
of an independent authority, which may be specific, provided that it fulfils the conditions 
laid down in Chapter VI of the Regulation. On the Regulation in general see K. MARIUSZ, 
Post-reform personal data protection in the European Union: general data protection regulation 
(EU) 2016/679, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016; while, on this specific issue M. 
GANARIN, Salvaguardia dei dati sensibili di natura religiosa e autonomia confessionale. Spunti 
per un’interpretazione secundum Costitutionem del regolamento europeo n. 2016/679, in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 11, 2018.  
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appropriate to make an exception in order to safeguard denominational 
autonomy and not to hinder their activities too much. However, the 
meaning of Article 91 is still not clear (in particular, it is not clear who has 
to verify the compliance of the denominational rules with the Regulation); 
also in this matter, the Court of Justice, which had not yet the opportunity 
to give its opinion on the matter55, has an important role to play.  
 
 
5 - Conclusions 
 
The current Court of Justice’s jurisprudence denies that Article 17 TFEU 
prevents the EU from affecting (even indirectly) every national discipline 
which is formally qualified as religiously connoted. The neutrality 
principle, of which the Article is an expression, requires the Union to refrain 
from regulating only those questions that are characterized by a high rate 
of denominational specificity. To abstractly predetermine whether an issue 
is strictly related to the denominational status, would be not only extremely 
complicated, but also inadequate for a system that is inspired to principles 
of reasonableness and proportionality. The possibility of a European 
intervention must be assessed case by case. It is necessary to find, in 
concrete terms, a balance between State sovereignity in religious matters 
and other principles that belong to the EU system. Among them, it’s 
important to remember the general principle of non-discrimination (Article 
21 of the Charter) and the right of religious freedom (Article 10 of the 
Charter) which could be, in the future, the legal basis for European action 
in favor of religious pluralism. However, at least for now, it is possible to 
talk of a European Law and Religion System only in the sense that it is up 
to the EU, and in particular to the Court of Justice to determine if a question 
affects the religious specifity of a certain denomination.  
These last considerations could be followed by another more general 
one, concerning the EU conferral principle, that is, despite the complexity 
of the topic, appropriate to mention at least in conclusion. As already 
pointed out, to pre-define what belongs or not to a certain legal area could 
be really difficult, especially when the boundaries of that area are delimited 
by notions which frequently change in time and space. This issue is 
particularly relevant for those legal disciplines which deal with religion and 
culture. As for the expression ‘status’, some terms used by the legislator 
                                                          
55 The above mentioned Jehovan Todistajat judgment (C-25/17) concerned facts 
happened before the Regulation came into force.  
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could, as a consequence of the diversity from State to State, prove to be 
indeterminate. For this reason, it is the task of the Court of Justice to operate 
each time a balance between European interests and the States’ claims for 
preserving their national identities (which are protected by Article 4, second 
paragraph, TEU)56. This “case by case” approach, instead of a general one, 
is not to be blamed: it could reduce the degree of certainty of the European 
legal system, but it is certainly more sensitive to the concrete needs of the 





Interpreting Article 17 TFEU: New Openings towards a European Law and 
Religion System 
 
ABSTRACT: Article 17 TFEU has been mainly interpreted as a “safeguard 
clause” aimed at preventing the EU from affecting (even indirectly) national 
disciplines religiously connoted. Although this traditional interpretation 
seems to find confirmation in the letter of the provision, in the systematic 
reading with Article 4 TEU, second paragraph, as well as in the original will 
of the parties, some scholars started giving credit to a different 
interpretation: the Article could allow the development of a European Law 
and Religion System. This article aims to investigate the current possibility 
for the aforementioned change of prospective. It focuses on three key 
factors: the interpretative difficulties concerning the Article, the recent 
jurisprudential evolution of the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the growing axiological-systematic relevance of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. This work argues that Article 17 TFEU does 
not recognize a national competence ex ante in all religious matters; it only 
requires the EU to refrain from regulating cases that are concretely 
characterized by a high rate of denominational specificity.  
 




                                                          
56 Cf. A. LICASTRO, A. RUGGERI, Diritto concordatario, cit., p. 29.  
57 Cf. C. LUZZATI, Ancora sulla certezza, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 
23, 2017, p. 6. 
